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Abstract
In his March 15 column in The Wall Street Journal, David Wessel drew some interesting
comparisons between Indonesia’s and California’s power crises. He observed that the U.S. federal
government and bond market will have assisted California on terms much more favorable than
those the International Monetary Fund imposed on Indonesia. Obviously California is not facing
the same issues regarding currencies and interest rates. Both governments, however, face the
political challenge of deregulating retail rates for electricity.
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INTRODUCTION
At first I thought that drawing an analogy between the Cali-
fornia and Asian power crises might be considered farfetched,
until I saw David Wessel's March 15, 2001, "Capital" column in
The Wall Street Journal entitled "California Shares Indonesia's
Pain." In it, he wrote:
Imagine a polyglot culture with a hot economy, much envied
by the rest of the world, that suddenly runs into trouble.
Its shell-shocked leaders are inundated with advice from eco-
nomic technocrats, many of whom insist that nothing bad
would have happened had their earlier advice been heeded.
Investments that seemed to be sure winners look imprudent
in hindsight. Washington pressures the government to raise
energy prices, dismissing local protests. The lights go out.
The search for scapegoats begins.
Indonesia 1997? Or, California 2001?1
It could be applied to either; even the same players are in-
volved: California utility Edison International is at the center of
the storm in its home state, but also in Indonesia, where it owns
a 40% interest in the troubled Paiton I power project. Gas and
energy marketer Enron Corp. features in the California story
and in a brewing dispute with the Indian government over its
Dabhol power project in Maharashtra State.
The Far Eastern Economic Review's recent characterization (in
an Article entitled "Darkness at the End of the Tunnel") of Indo-
nesia's energy markets as "a fool's paradise of unrealistic, below
* George K. Miller is a partner at Simpson Thacher & Bartlett in firm's Corporate
Department, concentrating in domestic and international project finance and leasing.
Mr. Miller was a resident partner in the Firm's Asian offices from 1991-1998. This Essay
was adapted from a speech given at the April 2001 International Biennial Project Fi-
nance Conference in Washington, D.C.
1. See David Wessel, Capital-California Shares Indonesia's Pain, WALL ST. J., Mar. 15,
2001, at Al.
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world-market prices"2 could be applied to California's transi-
tional retail power rates: the result in both cases is bankrupt util-
ities. Both jurisdictions suffer from inadequate transmission ca-
pacity. And so on.
I. WHAT WENT WRONG
Something has obviously gone wrong on the road to the in-
dependent power nirvana we were all expecting. Some light was
recently shed on the subject by the distinguished participants in
a seminar sponsored by the Project Finance Committee of the
New York City Bar Association, including the chair of the New
York Public Service Commission and the former head of the Cal-
ifornia Commission. But perhaps the most telling comments
came from Dr. Alfred Kahn, the grandfather of deregulation in
the United States.
Confining myself to his published remarks, Dr. Kahn has
much to teach us about the limits of deregulation of public ser-
vices with elements of "natural" monopoly, particularly in the
power sector. Ten years ago he wrote, prophetically:
In short, we must find ways of protecting captive customers
that do not involve either suppressing competition in markets
where that is feasible or handicapping their suppliers in re-
sponding to it .... So long as we retain the mixed system,
however, with its heavy overhang of sunk costs that companies
are entitled to recover, it seems to me silly to permit simple
gaming of it. ... We must also find ways of truly transferring
risk from ratepayers to investors.... I see no prospect of total
reliance on unregulated competition in the electric utility
field.
Think how energy regulators in developing countries must be
reacting to the disaster in California: "What were they think-
ing?!" they must be asking themselves. "Why would we ever let
that happen here?"
But the lessons here really do run both ways. The California
experience threatens to thoroughly discredit deregulation and
points up the urgent need for some rethinking, (Dr. Kahn sug-
gests the right approach might consist of "reforming regulation
to emulate competition.") We should not lose sight, however, of
2. See John McBeth, Darkness at the End of the Tunnel, FAR E. ECON. REv., Mar. 29,
2001.
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the fact that there are elements of the underlying legal system in
place there that would well serve policymakers elsewhere in ar-
riving at a swift resolution of their own microeconomic
problems.
I will not dwell here on issues of regulatory economics,
which I would not be competent to address anyway. Suffice it to
say that the California Commission's recent petition to the Fed-
eral Energy Regulatory Commission (or "FERC"), arguing mar-
ket power played a role in the explosion of wholesale power
prices in California, is surely not entirely without foundation in
theory as well as common sense, as the FERC has itself acknowl-
edged to a limited extent. As economist Paul Krugman recently
wrote in the New York Times, to say that energy company execu-
tives did not exercise market power in California would be to
imply they are either saints or bad businesspeople. Indeed,
Krugman argues temporary wholesale power price caps would
increase supply by discouraging gaming in the form of withhold-
ing capacity from the market to increase prices.
II. THE RULE OF LAW
In any event, I will focus on things lawyers know something
about, namely rules, contracts, and courts. In the end, in the
power sector context, the objective of these legal tools is the
same, whether in Brazil, California, China, India, Indonesia, or
anywhere else, namely to attract capital to the sector on a basis
that serves the public interest in reliable, economic power sup-
ply. Most of my experience has been in the United States and in
Asia, but I am sure that Latin America and other emerging mar-
kets, with high hopes placed today in deregulation, are anxiously
watching developments in both regions and hoping to avoid
treading in the same pitfalls.
Foreign investors in emerging markets take political risk for
granted. They tend generally to regard local judicial systems as
untried, or worse. This was probably not a significant factor in
the decisions of energy companies to invest in California. But as
David Wessel implied in his column in The Wall Street Journal, the
current crisis in California has generated plenty of political risk.
Aside from basic public order (think of Exxon Mobil having
to abandon its gas fields in Sumatra), a fundamental criterion
for investors is that there be a "level playing field," i.e., that the
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same rules apply to all players, without favoring some over others
due to extraneous considerations. Critics of privately negotiated
projects such as the Paiton project in Indonesia or the Dabhol
project in India complain of sweetheart deals favoring foreign
and well-connected local investors. This is part of the impetus
for the "power pool" version of deregulation of which Califor-
nia's is an example. Other jurisdictions around the world have
implemented similar systems, and some countries in Asia have
set this model as their ultimate goal.
On the other hand, attempts by policymakers to microman-
age in advance the outcome of negotiations with and between
private parties almost by definition will not work. In California,
outcomes produced by rules adopted only five years ago have
effectively been overturned because they did not meet rosy ex-
pectations. The result of going down this path is almost always
to impose unnecessary costs on the public, whether as ratepayers
or taxpayers.
Remember Dr. Kahn's injunction that investors, not the
public, should bear the risk of their investments. Investors will
do so where they believe they will have a fair shot at being re-
warded for it; they do not need special favors, but being neither
saints nor fools, they do tend to shy away from games where the
end result is engineered to be "heads, they lose, and tails, the
other guy wins."
A level playing field must be maintained by effective regula-
tion. Effective regulation requires clear lines of authority over
the activity in question. The federal system in effect in the
United States is particularly prone to overlaps, or, worse, gaps in
this regard. Governor Davis of California complains that he has
no authority over out-of-state generators, while the FERC (some-
what shortsightedly, in my view) has proved less than sympa-
thetic to California's plight.
Even centralizing governments, however (such as in China),
can have difficulty imposing their will in the absence of local
authorities effectively responsible for implementation. In some
countries ministries operate as competing independent fiefdoms
rather than being subject to central coordination. These failures
of authority can impede economic development.
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III. THE COURTS
An independent judiciary capable of enforcing rules, agree-
ments, and its own orders underpins a system of laws. Again,
countries vary greatly in the effectiveness ofjudicial enforcement
mechanisms, and they are nowhere perfect. As I have stated, this
has been an important issue for foreign investors in emerging
markets. Critics of common law-based adversarial judicial sys-
tems overlook the ways in which they steer parties to resolution
and finality, thus promoting future-oriented entrepreneurial ac-
tivity.
IV. BANKRUPTCY
The ultimate involuntary business resolution procedure is a
bankruptcy proceeding. It is especially effective in focusing par-
ties' minds on what must be done to resolve a business impasse.
Conversely, the lack of effective bankruptcy systems has clearly
impeded efforts at Asian financial restructuring in the last few
years. The threat (and use) of bankruptcy has been the single
greatest incentive (other than the lights going out) driving a
speedy solution to the California crisis. It may be the best exam-
ple of the creative destruction that is said to be a virtue of a mar-
ket system.
V. EXPROPRIATION
The ultimate political response to economic dislocation is to
expropriate the means of production. The fear of this has some-
what receded in recent years, but it always lurks in the back of
every entrepreneur's mind, especially in societies with a history
ofjustifying such action. Even in societies that reject it in princi-
ple, it nonetheless remains the ultimate safety valve, however
bounded with the requirements of a public purpose and fair
compensation. Both emerging market governments' unwilling-
ness to honor power purchase agreements and California's
seizure of power contracts and effectively forced purchase of its
utilities' transmission assets make clear that this remains the po-
litical solution in extremis to an economic crisis. All the more
important that such drastic measures be subject to the rule of
law.
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VI. THE ROLE OF LONG-TERM CONTRACTS
It is axiomatic that the law fosters commerce when it pro-
motes a stable allocation of risks to economic actors best able to
manage them. This is particularly critical to the long-term capi-
tal investments required to maintain a reliable power supply.
During the century or so when it was considered appropriate to
regulate electric utilities, the balance was struck by permitting
them to earn a reasonable return on their investments prudently
incurred to meet their obligation to serve customers.
The first incarnation of "independent" power simply per-
mitted utilities to shift some of their capital burden to less regu-
lated generators, but to support it by purchasing the resulting
power under long-term contracts that would replace the capacity
additions in the utilities' rate base. This was just regulation one
step removed.
This arrangement fell out of favor when the cost of financ-
ing new capacity fell below the agreed contract prices. Well
before PLN, the Indonesian state utility, or Indian, or Chinese
power authorities sought to renegotiate the terms of power
purchase contracts, investor-owned utilities across the United
States were doing the same thing. Of course, the trigger in Asia
was a currency crisis that vastly inflated the cost of power in local
currency under contracts effectively priced in dollars. The re-
gion has yet to recover.
The new model became the "merchant" generator selling
into an unregulated market, usually organized into a "pool" or
other form of exchange. The goal was to reduce rates through
competition in supply, which through unregulated prices would
find its "natural" balance with demand. When rates went up in-
stead people protested.
Consider for a moment the design of the California Power
Exchange, or CalPX. It claimed a monopoly of wholesale power
transactions, prohibited long-term contracts of any kind, and de-
creed that all sellers would receive the highest price required to
clear the market. The exchange was preempted, however, by the
FERC from policing the gaming inevitably resulting from this
structure.
The final irony is that the solution has been for the state to
enter into-you guessed it-long-term power purchase contracts
on behalf of the utilities. These contracts have resulted in aver-
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age prices-surprise-substantially lower than those generated
on the ill-starred CalPX. Moreover, the state's March 14 report
on its contracting program states that it is giving priority to con-
tracts "that result in construction of new power plants and offer
long-term price stability."
Sound familiar? The state has effectively reverted to the re-
gime in place immediately prior to deregulation, and in Asia
prior to the recent financial crisis. It has contracted a mix of
baseload and peak power and of terms, leaving some of its re-
quirement uncontracted after five years, in the hope of captur-
ing post-crisis price reductions.
Some of the contracts relate to particular plants and others
are pure supply contracts from power marketers. Some provide
fixed energy prices. Some are tolling agreements; some are sub-
ject to dispatch. The agreements contain other standard terms,
such as termination rights.
Who knows, some of them might even support project
financings of new generating capacity in California and neigh-
boring states. Could this be the new old model? Generators
such as AES, Duke, and Reliant, all perceived villains in Califor-
nia, actually contract forward most of their capacity. It is
divested utilities such as SoCalEd and PG&E and marketers such
as Enron who have been caught short in the California power
market. (Enron has continued to prosper in the gas market,
where it controls more physical supplies.)
VII. THE ASIAN DILEMMA
While California works its way out of its mess on a basis that
might actually continue to attract investment (though I think the
other shoe has yet to drop on forced rebates by generators), Asia
appears to be left with failed projects and no near-term prospect
of re-mobilizing foreign capital to meet infrastructure needs that
continue to grow. Despite the apparent contrast, however, in
both cases the solution will likely look similar, namely a partial
reduction in the perceived excess in price.
The future in both cases should also look pretty similar:
"Reforming regulation to emulate competition." In Asia, priva-
tization and de-monopolization of state utilities. In California
and elsewhere in the United States, the return of the power
purchase agreement and other hedging devices. In both re-
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gions, vigilance to preserve competition, limits on the adverse
impact of market power, and continued regulatory oversight to
maintain quality and reliability of service.
CONCLUSION
In his March 15 column in The Wall Street Journal, David
Wessel drew some interesting comparisons between Indonesia's
and California's power crises. He observed that the U.S. federal
government and bond market will have assisted California on
terms much more favorable than those the International Mone-
tary Fund imposed on Indonesia. Obviously California is not fac-
ing the same issues regarding currencies and interest rates. Both
governments, however, face the political challenge of deregulat-
ing retail rates for electricity.
Wessel concludes:
So now California confronts two conditions familiar to emerg-
ing markets. The first is an illness-in this case, flawed der-
egulation-that has grown more severe since symptoms first
emerged and weren't promptly treated. If you swallow the
right medicine, IMF doctors advise, there is a chance you'll
get better. Refusing treatment means you'll be sick for a long
time.
The second is the difficult process of distributing pain. In
emerging-market crises, there's always talk about sharing the
burden with private investors. But the ones who end up pay-
ing the bill are the people of the country itself. California is
paying out-of-state generators much more for electricity than
it is charging customers. Perhaps utility parent companies or
the generators will be nicked, but the big tab will be paid ei-
ther by California ratepayers or California taxpayers-and
they're the same people. Sounds familiar.3
3. Wessel, supra note 1.
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